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MORAL DISHARMONY: HUMAN 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENT  
LAWS, WARF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Jenny Shum* 
Abstract: Human embryonic stem cells have unique regenerative proper-
ties and the ability to develop into a variety of different cell types. Based 
on these properties, stem cell research is considered a promising bio-
medical field for the development of cell-based therapies to treat diseases. 
It is also a highly contentious field because these cells are derived from 
human embryos. The United States, unlike the European Union, does 
not have a moral component to the patent grant process and has granted 
several stem cell patents. This Note examines the intersection of these 
broad patents and U.S. policies limiting stem cell research funding and 
highlights their deleterious effects on the progress of human embryonic 
stem cell research. This Note also evaluates the feasibility of incorporating 
ethical criteria, as used in the European Union, for U.S. patent grants 
and concludes that uniform moral standards would be impossible to de-
termine and effectuate for this process. 
Introduction 
 The cornerstones of patent protection for an invention are that it 
grants the inventor the rights to his or her invention and gives the in-
ventor the right to exclude others from practicing the invention.1 Not-
withstanding these basic protections, patents do not confer the pat-
entee the right to practice the invention itself.2 That specific right may 
be governed by domestic laws within a particular State.3 Patents may be 
granted based on several principles, including: (1) as an incentive to 
                                                                                                                      
* Jenny Shum is the Senior Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. She has an M.S. and Ph.D. in the Biomedical Sciences (Biochemistry 
and Molecular Biology). 
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: 
How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 4 (2008); Robert P. 
Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 126–27 (4th 
ed. 2006). 
2 Russell Korobkin, Stem Cell Century: Law and Policy for a Breakthrough 
Technology 96 (2007); Berthold Rutz & Siobhan Yeats, Patenting of Stem Cell Related Inven-
tions in Europe, 1 Biotechnology J. 384, 384 (2006). 
3 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 96; Rutz & Yeats, supra note 2, at 384. 
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invent and (2) as a reward to the inventor for disclosing his or her in-
vention.4 Indeed, the United States Constitution affords exclusive rights 
for an inventor’s discoveries to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”5 Conflicts may arise between protecting an inventor’s pat-
ent rights and issuing overly broad patents that discourage further in-
novation.6 
 Biotechnology has produced numerous advances across various 
fields, including agriculture and medicine.7 As a result, there has been 
a steady surge of biotechnology patents sought and granted since the 
early-1990s.8 One major biomedical breakthrough has been the isola-
tion of adult and embryonic stem cells, first in mice and later in hu-
mans.9 Stem cells are immature cells that have not differentiated into a 
specialized cell type and are capable of self-renewal.10 Due to their un-
differentiated state and ability to self-perpetuate, stem cells are thought 
to hold special promise for a number of therapeutic uses, including as 
cellular replacements in damaged and degenerative cell or tissue dis-
orders.11 Extensive research has gone into determining how to direct 
the differentiation of stem cells such that they form cells of a specific 
type.12 For example, stem cells could be induced to differentiate into 
insulin-producing pancreatic b cells to treat Type I diabetics who lack 
them, or into osteoblasts, cells necessary for bone formation, to repair 
                                                                                                                      
4 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1024–31 (1989). 
5 U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
6 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 1, at 4. 
7 See Barry R. Schaller, Understanding Bioethics and the Law: The Promises 
and Perils of the Brave New World of Biotechnology 2–3 (2008). See generally Bio-
tech. Indus. Org., Guide to Biotechnology (2008), http://bio.org/speeches/pubs/ 
er/BiotechGuide2008.pdf (highlighting biotechnological innovations). 
8 Karl Bergman & Gregory D. Graff, The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: Implications 
for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development, 25 Nature Biotechnology 419, 
420 (2007); Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Pro-
tecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 143, 165 (2000). 
9 Martin Evans & Matthew H. Kaufman, Establishment in Culture of Pluripotential Cells 
from Mouse Embryos, 292 Nature 154–56 (1981); James Thompson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell 
Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282 Sci. 1145–47 (1998). 
10 L. Buttery, F. Rose & K. Shakesheff, Stem Cells and Tissue Engineering, in Medical 
Biotechnology 149, 154–55 (Judit Pongracz & Mary Keen eds., 2009). Differentiation is 
the process by which cells acquire particular characteristics that give the cell its functional-
ity. Id. at 155. 
11 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 18–21. 
12 Id. 
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bone defects in people suffering from osteoporosis or other related 
ailments.13 
 Embryonic stem cells (ESCs) are pluripotent, meaning that they 
can differentiate into almost all of the various cell types in the body.14 
An additional characteristic of ESCs is that they are capable of indefi-
nite self-renewal.15 In contrast, adult stem cells (ASCs) are multipotent 
and are therefore limited to differentiating only into a particular cell 
type(s), usually from the tissue of origin.16 Furthermore, ASCs differ in 
that they tend to have a finite period of proliferation and cannot repli-
cate indefinitely.17 There are also totipotent stem cells, which can de-
velop into any cell in the human body, thus having the potential to de-
velop into a complete living organism.18 The use of human ESCs 
(hESCs) is controversial and fraught with ethical concerns due to the 
isolation process, which results in the destruction of the embryo.19 Un-
like hESCs, ASCs are extracted via invasive procedures from tissues in 
the body and are typically present in exceptionally low numbers. Addi-
tionally, ASCs present challenges for culturing them in vitro, a process 
which restricts their potential clinical applications.20 
 In the United States and several other countries, including Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, stem cell patents are permitted.21 In 1998, 
                                                                                                                      
13 Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 155; Jojanneke M. Jukes et al., Endochondral Bone Tis-
sue Engineering Using Embryonic Stem Cells, 105 Proc. Nat’l. Acad. Sci. U.S. Am. 6840, 6840 
(2008). 
14 Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 155–56. 
15 Id. at 156. 
16 Id. at 155–56. Pluripotent stem cells are extracted after the cells have developed be-
yond the totipotent stage. Pluripotent stem cells cannot give rise to extraembryonic cells, 
such as placental cells, and cannot form a living organism. Pluripotent stem cells that have 
undergone partial differentiation, in turn, develop into multipotent progenitor cells. Ex-
amples of multipotent stem cells would be those obtained from the bone marrow or hema-
topoietic stem cells, which could only differentiate into various types of blood cells and not 
others, such as neural cells. See id. Recent studies suggest that adult tissues may contain 
small numbers of ASCs that may be pluripotent. See generally Mariusz Z. Ratajczak, A Hy-
pothesis for an Embryonic Origin of Pluripotent Oct-4+ Stem Cells in Adult Bone Marrow and Other 
Tissues, 21 Leukemia 860 (2007) (noting that evidence is accumulating that adult tissues 
contain stem cells that express certain markers characteristic of pluripotent embryonic 
stem cells). 
17 Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 156. 
18 Id. at 155. 
19 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 21; see Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 160. 
20 Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 156, 160. 
21 Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996) (is-
sued Dec. 1, 1998) [hereinafter ’780 Patent]; Aurora Plomer, Constitutional Limits on Moral 
Exemptions to European Biotech Patents, in Festskrift till Marianne Levin 487, 489, 493 
(Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al. eds., 2008). 
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the United States issued the first patent on stem cells to James Thom-
son and assigned it to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
(WARF).22 WARF later obtained two additional stem cell patents in 
2001 and 2006.23 Taken together, the patents broadly claimed both the 
process of developing hESC lines and all hESCs themselves as a compo-
sition of matter claim, regardless of how they are generated.24 The va-
lidity of these patents was subsequently upheld by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO).25 
 The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA) of the European Patent 
Office (EPO) issued a landmark ruling in 2008 in which it refused to 
allow a WARF hESC patent on the grounds that it was contrary to “pub-
lic order or morality” because it requires the use and destruction of 
human embryos.26 In distinct contrast to the United States, the Euro-
pean Union (EU), operating through the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) and the Directive by the European Parliament and the Council 
of the EU (Biotech Directive), incorporates ethical considerations into 
its patentability analysis.27 Article 53(a) of the EPC, also mirrored in 
Article 6 of the Biotech Directive, states that European patents will not 
be granted for “inventions the publication or exploitation of which 
would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality.”28 Moreover, the Bio-
tech Directive specifically notes, in particular, that “uses of human em-
bryos for industrial or commercial purposes” are to be excluded from 
patent protection.29 In 1999, the rules of the EPO were amended to 
                                                                                                                      
22 ’780 Patent, supra note 21. 
23 Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (filed Oct. 18, 2001) (is-
sued Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter ’913 Patent]; Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent 
No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998) (issued Mar. 13, 2001) [hereinafter ’806 Patent]. 
24 ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23; ’780 Patent, supra note 21. 
25 Press Release, Wis. Alumni Research Found., United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice Upholds Key WARF Stem Cell Patent (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.warf.org/up-loads/ 
media/Key_hES_Cell_Patent-Upheld_Release_v6–3.pdf [hereinafter WARF-PTO PR1]; Press 
Release, WARF, Patent Office Upholds Remaining WARF Stem Cell Patents (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.warf.org/news/news.jsp?news_id=226 [hereinafter WARF-PTO PR2]; Press Re-
lease, WARF, U.S. Patent Office Issues Certificates to Uphold WARF Stem Cell Patents ( June 
26, 2008), http://www.warf.org/news/news.jsp?news_id=234. 
26 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, Case G 0002/06, Eur. Patent Off., 23–26 
(Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter EBoA Decision]. 
27 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973 [hereinafter 
EPC]; Eur. Parliament & Council Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protec-
tion of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC) [hereinafter Biotech Direc-
tive]. 
28 EPC, supra note 27, art. 53(a); Biotech Directive, supra note 27, at 18–19. 
29 Biotech Directive, supra note 27, at 18. 
2010] Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, WARF & Public Policy 157 
include a new section on biotechnological inventions that incorporated 
the exclusions delineated within the Biotech Directive.30 
 This Note first examines the differing approaches toward the pat-
entability of human embryonic stem cells in the United States and the 
EU, with particular attention to the WARF patents. It next analyzes 
whether moral criteria should play a role in the determination of pat-
entability. It also assesses whether the United States should harmonize 
its stem cell patent policy with that of the EU. Finally, this Note consid-
ers the impact of U.S. policies regulating human embryonic stem cell 
research, both domestically and internationally. 
I. Background 
A. Patentability of Stem Cells in the United States 
 Patents in the United States are granted for inventions that are 
useful, novel, and nonobvious.31 Section 101 of Title 35 of the United 
States Code states that patentable inventions consist of “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”32 In 1889, the Commis-
sioner of the U.S. Patent Office first addressed the issue of patenting 
living subject matter in Ex parte Latimer, by ruling that allowing patents 
to products of nature would be “unreasonable and impossible.”33 This 
stance changed in the seminal case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that genetically modified bacteria, living or-
ganisms, could be patented.34 In making its decision, the Court noted 
that it was irrelevant to patentability whether the invention was living or 
inanimate.35 Subsequently, in Ex parte Allen, the U.S. PTO’s Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) ruled that a chromosomally 
altered oyster, modified to be sterile, was patentable.36 
 Allen, taken together with Chakrabarty, indicated that the complex-
ity of the organism was also irrelevant to patentability.37 Shortly after 
                                                                                                                      
30 Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, R. 
28, Nov. 29, 2000. 
31 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103(a). 
32 Id. § 101. 
33 Dec. Com. Pat. 123, 126 (1889). 
34 See 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
35 Id. at 313. 
36 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987). 
37 Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materi-
als 127 (4th ed. 2007). 
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the BPAI’s ruling in Allen, the Commissioner of the U.S. PTO issued a 
notice stating that nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular 
living organisms, including animals, were patentable subject matter.38 
The BPAI explicitly clarified the issue of whether patenting of human 
beings was permissible, stating “[a] claim directed to or including 
within its scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101.”39 The basis for the BPAI’s 
analysis was that the patenting of human beings was akin to slavery and, 
since one person cannot be the property of another, it was therefore a 
contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment.40 The U.S. PTO patent 
examiner guidelines also require that “[i]f the broadest reasonable in-
terpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a human 
being, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must be made indicating 
that the claimed invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.”41 
 The moral and ethical controversy surrounding the patentability 
of human embryonic stem cells arises from their isolation process, 
which renders the embryo non-viable.42 Under the judicial doctrine of 
beneficial utility, emanating from an 1817 case, Lowell v. Lewis, an oth-
erwise patentable invention is not patentable if it is “injurious to the 
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”43 Furthermore, 
after a patent application was filed for animal-human hybrids— chime-
ras—the U.S. PTO issued a position statement indicating that “inven-
tions directed towards human/non-human chimeras could, under cer-
tain circumstances, not be patentable because, among other things, 
they would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects of the 
utility requirement.”44 Subsequently in 1999, although Lowell was not 
specifically overruled, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
indicated that the PTO and patent laws were not intended to serve as 
arbiters of what constitutes immoral or illegal activities.45 The court 
suggested that the determination of whether particular inventions 
                                                                                                                      
38 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. Notice: Animals—Patentability, reprinted in 1077 Offi-
cial Gazette Pat. & Trademark Off. 24 (Apr. 7, 1987). 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 
41 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Manual of Patent Examination Procedure § 2105 (8th 
ed. rev. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
42 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 21; Buttery et al., supra note 10, at 160. 
43 15 Fed. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
44 Media Advisory, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms 
Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/1998/ 
98-06.jsp. 
45 See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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should be unpatentable was best left to Congress.46 In light of these 
prior rulings and the position of the U.S. PTO, hESCs are indeed con-
sidered patentable subject matter, as evidenced by the issuance of the 
WARF patents.47 
B. Stem Cell Patentability in the European Union 
 In the EU, patents are granted through the EPO, which was estab-
lished by the EPC in 1973.48 Patents are granted for inventions that are 
novel, susceptible to industrial application, and involve an inventive 
step.49 Article 53 of the EPC also lays out the exclusions for patentabil-
ity.50 Inventions whose exploitation would be contrary to public order 
and morality are precluded from being patented.51 In the Guidelines 
for Examination to the EPO, the criteria for its application are quite 
narrow, stating: “This provision is likely to be invoked only in rare and 
extreme cases. A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable 
that the public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent 
that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable.”52 
 In 1998, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU is-
sued Directive 98/44/EC concerning the patenting of biotechnological 
innovations.53 This biotechnology directive was subsequently incorpo-
rated into the EPC.54 Within it, Article 5(1) states that “[t]he human 
body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the 
simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or par-
tial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.”55 In 
addition, Article 6(1) reiterates the moral component to patentability 
assessments. It also specifically notes in Article 6(2)(c) that patents are 
excluded for inventions involving “uses of human embryos for indus-
trial or commercial purposes.”56 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. 
47 See ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23. 
48 EPC, supra note 27, art. 4. 
49 Id. art. 52(1). 
50 Id. art. 53(a)–(c). 
51 Id. art. 53(a). 
52 European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European Pat-
ent Office, pt. C, ch. IV-4.1 (2005) [hereinafter EPO Guidelines]. 
53 Biotech Directive, supra note 27. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. art. 5(1). 
56 Id. art. 6(2)(c). 
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 While both the United States and the EU permit the patenting of 
human cell lines,57 the EBoA of the EPO issued their decision in No-
vember 2008 on the appeal of a WARF patent that had been previously 
rejected on moral grounds.58 The EBoA affirmed the earlier ruling 
based on moral objections, under Article 53(a) of the EPC, and added 
that that it was “not possible to grant a patent for an invention that 
necessarily involves the use and destruction of human embryos,” which 
is a violation of Rule 28(c) of the Convention.59 
II. Discussion 
 While the recent ruling on the WARF patent by the EBoA of the 
EPO and the traditional stance in the United States towards permitting 
such patents may have clarified respective national standards on the 
patenting of stem cells, the differing criteria utilized renders it difficult 
for a prospective patentee to ensure comprehensive intellectual prop-
erty protection on an international scale.60 Moreover, individual na-
tional policy towards stem cell research and funding must also be con-
sidered in terms of its effects on innovation and intellectual property 
rights.61 
                                                                                                                      
57 See generally In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1985); European Patent No. 
0428656 (filed May 14, 1990) (issued May 29, 1991). 
58 EBoA Decision, supra note 26, at 23–26. The EPC was revised in 2000. The current 
Rule 28(c) was Rule 23(d)(c) in the original EPC of 1973. EPC, supra note 27 (entered 
into force December 13, 2007). 
59 European Patent Office, No European Patent for WARF/Thomson Stem Cell Appli-
cation, Nov. 27, 2008, http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2008/20081127.html. 
60 See generally ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23; ’780 Patent, supra 
note 21; EBoA Decision, supra note 26. 
61 See Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, in 2 Pub. Papers 953 (Aug. 9, 
2001) [hereinafter GWB Address]; European Commission Directorate General: Research, 
Summary of the 25 EU Member States Regulations on Human Embryonic Stem Cells Re-
search (Feb. 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/p1/stemcells/pdf/stemcell_hesc_ 
regulations_ 2006feb.pdf; Eur. Comm’n Directorate General: Research, Directorate 
E - Biotechnology, Agriculture & Food, Survey on Opinions from National Ethics 
Committees or Similar Bodies, Public Debate and National Legislation in Rela-
tion to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Use: in EU Member States 1 
( July 2004) (Line Matthiessen-Guyader ed.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/ 
p1/stemcells/pdf/stemcell_survey_2004_i.pdf; Eur. Comm’n Directorate General: 
Research, Directorate E - Biotechnology, Agriculture & Food, Survey on Opin-
ions from National Ethics Committees or Similar Bodies, Public Debate and Na-
tional Legislation in Relation to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Use: 
Countries Associated to FP6 and Third Countries 2 ( July 2004) (Line Matthiessen-
Guyader ed.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/p1/stemcells/pdf/stemcell_ 
survey_2004_ii.pdf. 
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A. Patents, Policy, and Scientific Research in the United States 
 The historical importance of patents in the United States is re-
flected in the constitutional grant of authority, which formed the foun-
dation for a national patent system, by the Framers of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.62 Furthermore, one of the earliest acts passed by the first Congress 
was the first U.S. patent statute in 1790.63 Despite the significance given 
to the “promot[ion] of the Progress of Science,” tensions may arise 
when political policy agendas conflict with scientific research and hin-
der innovation, thereby impacting intellectual property.64 
1. WARF Patents 
 Patents for living biological matter, such as cell lines or organisms, 
have been allowed since Chakrabarty.65 In 1998, James Thomson pub-
lished his work, which was funded by the University of Wisconsin and 
Geron Corporation, on the first isolation of human ESC lines.66 For this 
work, three patents, known respectively as the ’780, the ’806, and the 
’913 patent, were issued between 1998 and 2006, and the rights were 
assigned to WARF.67 All three patent terms will expire by 2015.68 The 
’780 patent claims both pluripotent primate ESCs and a method of iso-
lating a primate ESC line.69 Additionally, the ’806 patent claims both 
pluripotent human ESCs and a method of isolating an hESC line.70 The 
’913 patent also claims pluripotent hESCs.71 Taken together, the 
breadth of the WARF patents could potentially cover any and all hESCs 
regardless of the process by which the cells are derived.72 Subsequently, 
WARF has come under intense criticism by U.S.-based researchers for 
the cost and restrictiveness of its licensing practices.73 
                                                                                                                      
62 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
63 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (Apr. 10, 1790). 
64 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Korobkin, supra note 2, at 26–60. 
65 See MPEP, supra note 41, § 2105. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980). 
66 Carl Gulbransen, WARF’s Licensing Policy for ES Cell Lines, 25 Nature Biotechnol-
ogy 387 (2007); Thompson, supra note 9. 
67 ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23; ’780 Patent, supra note 21. 
68 See ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23; ’780 Patent, supra note 21. 
69 ’780 Patent, supra note 21. 
70 ’806 Patent, supra note 23. 
71 ’913 Patent, supra note 23. 
72 See ’913 Patent, supra note 23; ’806 Patent, supra note 23; ’780 Patent, supra note 21; 
Korobkin, supra note 2, at 93, 96. 
73 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 96–99; Editorial, Burning Bridges, 25 Nature 2 (2007). 
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 In 2006, the Public Patent Foundation and the Foundation for 
Taxpayer and Consumer Rights filed requests with the U.S. PTO for the 
reexamination of all three WARF patents.74 The two groups sought to 
invalidate the patents citing that they were obvious and not novel.75 
Upon reexamination, the U.S. PTO in 2007 issued a preliminary, non-
final, rejection of the three WARF patents on the basis that they had not 
met the nonobviousness requirement.76 The U.S. PTO upheld the ’913 
patent in February 2008.77 They then issued final decisions upholding 
the ’780 and ’806 patents in March 2008.78 
2. Stem Cell Policies and Restrictions 
 While there has been considerable debate over the moral and eth-
ical use of human embryos in scientific research and for medical condi-
tions, it was not until 1996 that Congress passed an appropriations bill 
that included a rider directed toward the issue of hESC research.79 
Congressman Jay Dickey introduced an amendment to the bill (The 
Dickey Amendment) that prohibited the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) from using its funds for “the creation of a hu-
man embryo or embryos for research purposes” or for “research in 
which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or know-
ingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for 
research on fetuses in utero.”80 HHS also provides the funding for the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), a major source of scientific re-
search grants in the United States.81 President William Clinton signed 
                                                                                                                      
74 Two Groups Try for Revocation of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, 25 Biotechnol-
ogy L. Rep. 555 (Oct. 2006). 
75 Korobkin, supra note 2, at 118. 
76 Id. at 119. 
77 Press Release, Geron Corp., U.S. Patent Office Upholds Key Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Patent (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.geron.com/media/pressview.aspx?id=833; 
WARF-PTO PR1, supra note 25. 
78 Press Release, Geron Corp., U.S. Patent Office Upholds Two Additional Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Patents in Reexamination Decisions (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www. 
geron.com/media/pressview.aspx?id=834; WARF-PTO PR2, supra note 25. It is not unusual 
for the U.S. PTO to issue preliminary rejections and then later affirm the patents. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal 
Year 2008 127–28 (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/ 
2008annualreport.pdf. 
79 Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104–99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 
(1996). 
80 Id. § 128, 110 Stat. at 34. 
81 See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Fiscal Year 2008 Citizens’ Report: Sum-
mary of Performance and Financial Results, http://www.hhs.gov/budget/Citizens Re- 
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the Dickey Amendment into law, which has been renewed annually ev-
er since.82 Essentially, the amendment rendered any scientific research 
on hESCs ineligible for federal funding.83 Indeed, the breakthrough 
hESC research by Thomson, which led to the WARF patents, was, as a 
matter of course, funded through private sources.84 
 Soon after Thomson revealed his successful creation of hESC lines, 
the General Counsel of HHS, Harriet S. Rabb, issued a legal opinion, at 
the request of the Director of NIH, on whether federal funding was 
necessarily prohibited for research on hESC lines that were already es-
tablished.85 Rabb stated that the “statutory prohibition on the use of 
funds appropriated to HHS for human embryo research would not ap-
ply” to research on hESCs because the cells did not meet the statutory 
definition of a human embryo.86 Furthermore, the memorandum 
noted that hESCs “cannot be considered human embryos consistent 
with the commonly accepted or scientific understanding of that 
term.”87 Subsequently, in 2000, NIH published guidelines for research 
on hESCs.88 The NIH guidelines permitted federal funding for hESC 
research where the cells were not derived from human embryos cre-
ated for research purposes.89 Upon taking office in 2001, President 
Bush ordered the Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson, to evaluate 
the new NIH guidelines and to postpone the review of pending hESC 
research grant applications.90 
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 On August 9, 2001, President Bush delivered a presidential address 
to the nation and announced that his administration would only permit 
federal funding for stem cell research on cell lines already in existence 
at the time.91 Within hours of the President’s address, the Secretary of 
HHS and the Acting Director of NIH issued statements in support of 
the policy.92 NIH later withdrew the earlier guidelines for hESC re-
search.93 
 Despite his announced policy, President Bush never formally is-
sued an executive order that called for the prohibition of funding for 
hESC lines created after August 9, 2001 or that banned research that 
involved the destruction of embryos.94 In response to Congress’s at-
tempt in 2006 to relax the policy restraints on hESC research by passing 
the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, President Bush issued the 
first veto of his presidency, then in its fifth year.95 In 2007, Congress 
tried again to enact the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, and, 
once more, it was vetoed by President Bush.96 On the same day, Presi-
dent Bush signed an executive order requiring the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to conduct and direct research towards the isola-
tion of hESCs that could be obtained through alternative methods of 
derivation.97 This executive order gave priority to and federal funds for 
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identifying new methods of isolating, deriving, producing, and testing 
hESCs and still maintained the funding ban on any research on estab-
lished hESC lines derived from embryos.98 
 There were indications early on that these restrictions on federal 
funding for hESC research would be lifted by the incoming presidential 
administration.99 As part of his election platform, and also soon after 
taking office, candidate and later President Barack Obama stated his 
intent to revisit the issue of federal funding of hESC research beyond 
the prescribed cell lines.100 On March 9, 2009, President Obama signed 
an executive order that revoked President Bush’s 2007 executive order 
and restored federal funding for research on all hESC lines, regardless 
of derivation methods.101 
3. Hindering the “Progress of Science”? 
 The confluence of a restrictive government policy on hESC re-
search and the broad scope of the WARF patents have constrained the 
ability of many scientists to conduct hESC research.102 While President 
Bush, in articulating his policy towards limiting federal funding to on-
ly then-established hESC lines, stated that “more than 60 genetically 
diverse stem cells lines already exist,”103 hESC researchers were quick 
to question not only the accuracy of the number but also the ade-
quacy of the cell lines.104 Indeed, some have stated that the actual 
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number of viable stem cell lines at the time may have been less than 
five.105 
 Moreover, the utilization of a combination of Material Transfer 
Agreements (MTA) and licensing fees for the WARF patents has proved 
onerous on not only commercial hESC endeavors but also on academic 
research.106 The MTAs require an initial cash payment and include 
commercial reach-through rights, which prohibit commercial research 
without another licensing agreement.107 Departing from the conven-
tion of a single payment per academic institution, WARF also sought to 
charge per cell line and for each individual investigator within an insti-
tution.108 Commercial licensing fees ranged from $75,000 to $400,000, 
plus royalties on any sales.109 In response to the objections raised by the 
scientific community, WARF modified its policy and no longer requires 
a license for industry-sponsored research performed at academic or 
non-profit institutions.110 
B. Biotechnology and EU Standards 
 The EPO, which is an organ of the European Patent Organization, 
governs the granting of patents in Europe.111 The Organization is an 
intergovernmental organization that was established by the EPC.112 
There are currently 35 member states within the Organization.113 While 
the EPO may grant patents, the enforcement of these patents is left to 
the individual member states and their respective national laws.114 Sev-
eral European Patent Organization member states also have their own 
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independent patent offices, which grant national patents.115 Further-
more, inventors must still file individual national patent applications in 
those states that are not signatories to the EPC.116 The European Par-
liament and EU Council issued a Biotech Directive, which prohibited 
patents for inventions that used human embryos for commercial pur-
poses, to harmonize divergent patent laws between the EU and EPO 
member states.117 This Biotech Directive was then incorporated into the 
EPC.118 All twenty-seven EU member states have implemented its provi-
sions into their domestic laws.119 
1. WARF European Patent Application 
 While fetal and adult stem cells are patentable in Europe,120 the 
issue of whether hESCs are patentable had not been settled when 
WARF sought just such a patent.121 The patent application was initially 
refused by the EPO on the grounds that it was prohibited under Article 
53(a) and Rule 28(c) of the EPC.122 Article 53(a) excludes inventions 
that would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality.123 Rule 28(c) fur-
ther specifies that patents cannot be granted for inventions concerning 
the “use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.”124 
Upon appeal, the EPO Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) referred four 
questions to the EPO EBoA, as permitted under Article 112(a) of the 
EPC.125 Decisions by the EBoA are binding on the EPO.126 
 The TBA asked the EBoA to clarify several issues: (1) whether Rule 
28(c) was applicable to the WARF patent application, given that the 
application had been filed prior to the entry into force of the rule; (2) 
if Rule 28(c) was in force, then is the rule applicable to the WARF ap-
plication even if the method is not part of the claims?; (3) if the an-
swers to questions 1 and 2 were no, did Article 53(a) forbid the patent-
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ing of such claims?; and (4) is it relevant that after the filing date, the 
same products could be obtained without using a method that neces-
sarily involved the destruction of human embryos?127 
 On November 25, 2008, the EPO EBoA issued its decision. In ad-
dressing the first question, the EBoA ruled that Rule 28(c) was applica-
ble to pending patent applications because it did not require transi-
tional provisions for pending cases.128 As such, the rule must encompass 
the pending patent applications.129 With respect to question 2, the 
EBoA noted that the text of Rule 28(c) is not directed toward the claims 
but refers to “inventions” as a whole.130 Since questions 1 and 2 were 
answered in the affirmative, the EBoA did not reply to the third ques-
tion.131 The EBoA answered the final question by ruling that technical 
developments that became public after the filing date were irrelevant to 
determining whether a claim violates Rule 28(c).132 The EBoA con-
cluded that its decision was “not concerned with the patentability in 
general of inventions relating to human stem cells or human stem cell 
cultures” but that it prohibited patents for “inventions concerning [hu-
man stem cell cultures] which can only be obtained by the use involving 
their destruction of human embryos.”133 
2. United Kingdom—A Nuanced Perspective 
 The United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (U.K.-IPO) has 
issued its own guidance on the patentability of biotechnological inven-
tions.134 Similar to the EPO, they note that certain processes and things 
are not patentable for commercial purposes because they would be 
contrary to public morality, where the excluded inventions encompass 
“the commercial or industrial use of human embryos.”135 
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 Notwithstanding the public morality criteria, the U.K.-IPO cur-
rently permits patent applications for pluripotent hESCs.136 The U.K.-
IPO draws a distinction between totipotent and pluripotent hESCs, stat-
ing that human totipotent cells, unlike pluripotent hESCs, can poten-
tially develop into an entire human body.137 The U.K.-IPO thus holds 
them unpatentable because “the human body at various stages of its 
formation and development is excluded from patentability.”138 
III. Analysis 
 There are several rationales for the pursuit of global harmonization 
of patent laws and the creation of a unified patent system.139 Harmoni-
zation would bring increased efficiency to patent offices and certainty to 
patentees.140 In addition, harmonization could reduce disparate patent 
status across states, where an invention would be granted a patent in one 
state, but a parallel patent application in another state would be de-
nied.141 By setting a common standard, patent offices would be able to 
coordinate their prior art searches and patent application examina-
tions.142 This effect would not only reduce the overall cost to the patent 
offices, but it would also reduce the expenses of the patent applicant, as 
the applicant need not be concerned with addressing varying national 
patent standards.143 
 Moreover, uniformity may enhance the effectiveness in enforcing 
intellectual property rights.144 This increased certainty in the value and 
security of global intellectual property rights may also lead to greater 
disclosures by inventors, which ultimately benefits the public.145 Indeed, 
it has been proposed that harmonization would balance the incentive 
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system and “no country will take a ‘free ride’ on the investment in re-
search and development that other countries’ patent systems induce.”146 
 While harmonization of patent laws would provide much needed 
clarity to patent holders seeking to protect their intellectual property 
rights globally, there are also disincentives to states seeking to adopt 
uniform patent laws.147 These disincentives may include initial difficul-
ties in achieving agreement between states on precisely what these pat-
ent laws should be and later problems with altering undesirable or ob-
solete provisions.148 
A. Moral Relevance in Stem Cell Patentability 
 Unlike the EU, the United States presently divorces the issue of 
morals from that of whether stem cells are patentable subject matter.149 
Despite this formal separation, the United States can interject morality 
and limit what inventions may be patentable through the enactment of 
legislation.150 The mere granting of a patent does not necessarily result 
in the practice of the patented invention.151 States may choose to enact 
legislation that prevents the application or dissemination of the inven-
tion.152 
 A major impediment to injecting morals into determining pat-
entability is that any such criteria are necessarily subjective and may not 
be universal in scope.153 Morality may differ from state to state depend-
ing on a number of factors, including ethics and cultural influences.154 
Even within the EU itself, questions have been raised about how to 
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identify the European morality standard.155 Further inconsistency has 
been noted with respect to the two distinct tests that have been used for 
assessing patent challenges based on morality under the EPC.156 One 
test relies on whether there would be “public abhorrence” over the 
granting of a patent.157 The second test examines whether the patent 
grant would be “unacceptable” under “conventionally accepted stan-
dards of conduct of European culture.”158 It is not difficult to see where 
an invention might not reach the standard of “public abhorrence” but 
could still be found “unacceptable” and be denied a patent.159 
 An additional consideration is whether patent offices themselves 
would be reluctant or have sufficient guidance to make determinations 
on whether an invention overcomes the morals hurdle to obtaining a 
patent.160 Under EPO patent examination rules, the examiner would 
look first to see if an invention is within the list of specifically exempted 
inventions and then consider the morality issue.161 Commentators have 
noted that a temporal ambiguity exists for the morality assessment.162 It 
is unclear as to whether this determination should be performed at the 
time of the patent application or after the granting of the patent.163 
This ambiguity raises additional issues concerning if, by whom, and 
when opponents of the patents should be notified.164 
 Should the United States choose to harmonize its patent laws with 
those of the EU and introduce moral hurdles to patentability, there 
may well be confusion over precisely which standards should prevail.165 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Aurora Plomer, University of Nottingham: School of Law, Stem Cell 
Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics Report 1, 111–12 (2006), http://www.not- 
tingham.ac.uk/law/StemCellProject/project.report.pdf [hereinafter Nottingham Report] 
(summarizing several different perspectives of what constitutes European morality, includ-
ing “common European concepts,” “fairly widely shared perceptions,” or as laid out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 
156 Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European 
Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 21–36 (2001). 
157 Id. at 21–27. 
158 Id. at 21. 
159 See id. 
160 Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of 
Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 685, 709–13 (2004); see Gitter, supra 
note 156, at 36–43. 
161 EPO Guidelines, supra note 52, pt. C, ch. II-7.1 to 7.2, ch. IV-4.1; Nottingham Re-
port, supra note 155, at 107–08. 
162 Enerson, supra note 160, at 712; Gitter, supra note 156, at 39. 
163 Enerson, supra note 160, at 712; Gitter, supra note 156, at 39. 
164 See Enerson, supra note 160, at 712; Gitter, supra note 156, at 39. 
165 See Nottingham Report, supra note 155, at 51–52, 111–12, 133; Heike Vogelsang-
Wenke, Patenting of Stem Cells and Processes Involving Stem Cells According to the Rules of the 
European Patent Convention, 23 Biotechnology L. Rep. 155, 158 (2004). 
172 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 33:153 
In instances where a definitive European wide moral standard has yet 
to be established, it has been suggested that patents be granted and 
individual states can then invalidate the patents, if necessary, according 
to their national norms.166 Moreover, cultural shifts may also affect mo-
rality standards over time.167 Allowing current measures of morality to 
influence the patenting of innovations would introduce more unpre-
dictability into the patent system.168 Patents, once granted, may run the 
risk of revocation.169 Indeed, in 2006, the Bundespatentgericht/BPatG 
(German Federal Patent Court) partially revoked a 1999 patent di-
rected to a method for producing ESCs.170 Despite the fact that the pa-
tent did not claim industrial or commercial use of human embryos, the 
BPatG nullified the patent claims directed toward ESC lines derived 
from human embryos while upholding the claims for ESCs derived 
from other sources.171 Given that Germany incorporated the Biotech 
Directive into the German Patent Act in 2004,172 and that the patent 
itself was granted in 1999, this decision was a retroactive application of 
the moral patentability exclusion for inventions.173 
 Amid these concerns, the application of moral criteria to U.S. pat-
entability determinations will likely only add uncertainty into the patent 
application process.174 Furthermore, morality standards are not static, 
and meaningful consensus on such moral patentability criteria may be 
                                                                                                                      
166 Nottingham Report, supra note 155, at 112–13. 
167 UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 151, at 375. 
168 See Enerson, supra note 160, at 714–15. 
169 See Nottingham Report, supra note 155, at 112–13. 
170 Bundespatentgericht [BPatG] [Federal Patent Court] Dec. 5, 2006, ref. no. 3 Ni 
42/04 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter BPatG Decision]; Stefan Danner, Stem Cell Patent Partially Revoked, 
Managing Intell. Prop., May 1, 2007, http://www.managingip.com/Article/1377031/ 
Stem-cell-patent-partially-revoked.html; see Neurale Voläuferzellen, Verfahren zu ihrer Her-
stellung und ihre Verwendung zur Therapie von neuralen Defekten [Neural Precursor Cells, 
Method for the Production and Use Thereof in Neural Defect Therapy], F.R.G. Patent No. 
DE 19756864 (issued Apr. 29, 1999). 
171 BPatG Decision, ref. no. 3 Ni 42/04; Thomas Friede, German Federal Patent Court De-
cided on the Morality of Deriving Cells (3 Ni 42/04—Greenpeace v. Oliver Brüstle) from Human 
Embryonic Stem (ES) Cells, VI Bardehle Pagenberg IP Rep. 3 (2006), http://www.bardehle. 
com/uploads/media/IP_Report_2006_VI.pdf. 
172 State of Play, supra note 119, at 1–2; Franz-Josef Zimmer & Svenja Sethmann, Act 
Implementing the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions in Germany (Bio-
PatG), 24 Biotechnology L. Rep. 561, 561 (2005). 
173 Friede, supra note 171, at 3. The German Patents Act, in language that mirrors that of 
the Biotech Directive, prohibits the granting of patents for inventions involving the use of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. Das deutsche Patentgesetz [German 
Patents Act], Dec. 18, 1980, BGBl. I, § 2, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bund- 
esrecht/patg/gesamt.pdf. 
174 See Enerson, supra note 160, at 714–15. 
2010] Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, WARF & Public Policy 173 
difficult to reach.175 The potential for retroactive revocation of patents, 
based solely on newly established standards, may also serve to discour-
age patentees.176 Higher litigation costs may result from increased pat-
ent revocation attempts, which may be encouraged by the enactment of 
moral hurdles to patentability.177 
B. Confluence of Policy and Patents: Impact on Stem Cell Research 
 Patents are granted to encourage innovation and as a reward for 
disclosing the invention.178 This quid pro quo of sufficient disclosure 
for the monopoly granted to the patentee has been a fundamental 
principle of the patent system.179 The intersection of patent law, legisla-
tive policy, and science has retarded the progress of stem cell research, 
where privatization of resources, concomitant with a withdrawal of fed-
eral funding, has impeded research and development.180 
1. Policy and WARF Factors Have Hindered U.S. Stem Cell Research 
 Given the broad scope of the patent claims over the development 
of hESCs and over hESCs themselves, WARF is able to prohibit any de-
rivation, use, importation, or research into hESC lines in the United 
States unless interested parties first enter into licensing agreements.181 
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Additionally, due to the essential nature of having access to and the 
ability to generate new hESCs for research purposes, WARF’s patents 
are substantial impediments to the ideal of granting patents to “pro-
mot[e] the Progress of Science.”182 Granting a monopoly on a basic 
scientific research tool can severely limit subsequent research.183 Com-
mentators have warned of the danger in granting overly broad patents 
in biotechnology because it enables “the individual or firm who first 
came up with a particular practical application to control a broad array 
of improvements and applications.”184 Innovation and discoveries in 
biotechnology are dependent on building upon fundamental tech-
niques.185 The granting of a patent that covers all hESC lines without 
regard to the method of derivation does little to encourage subsequent 
innovation and improvements.186 In this instance, the public benefit is 
not at all commensurate with the monopoly rights.187 
 While financial interests may provide incentive for patent holders to 
license their innovations for commercial purposes, academic researchers 
have often been spared the full brunt of transaction costs associated with 
utilizing patented innovations.188 With the increased interest by aca-
demic institutions in patenting and protecting their intellectual property, 
there is less of a distinction between academic and purely commercial 
entities.189 Although the WARF patents were a significant hindrance to 
academic stem cell researchers, the limiting of federal funding by Presi-
dent Bush was equally, if not more, onerous.190 The combination of these 
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two factors had effects on not only issues pertaining to seeking new 
sources of research funds but also where and how stem cell research 
would be pursued.191 
 Federal funds have consistently accounted for the majority of aca-
demic funding for scientific research and development.192 In 2006, fed-
eral support accounted for approximately 63% of the funding spent by 
academic institutions on research and development.193 The funding 
limitations created by President Bush’s stem cell policy forced academic 
institutions and researchers to carefully segregate any research con-
ducted on non-sanctioned hESCs from all other federally funded re-
search occurring in their facilities.194 Essentially, no federally funded 
equipment, space, materials, supplies, or staff could be used for any 
such research.195 In practice, the inability to utilize existing laboratory 
equipment and the difficulties associated with ensuring strict separa-
tion of consumables and staff required institutions to seek and use pri-
vate funds to establish duplicate research facilities for the sole purpose 
of conducting stem cell research.196 In response to the federal policy, 
additional funding for hESC research was authorized by eight states, 
including California and New York.197 
 While early fears of vast numbers of stem cell researchers leaving 
the United States for foreign institutions have been unfounded, several 
prominent stem cell researchers have left to pursue their research in 
Asia.198 Singapore, with more liberal research laws, has devoted gov-
ernment resources to establishing itself as a leader in stem cell research 
and enticing notable scientists there.199 By contrast, the diverse stem 
cell research regulations among the EU member states, ranging from 
permissive to prohibitive towards embryo research and hESC deriva-
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tion, may have been deterrents to researchers dismayed by U.S. fund-
ing limitations.200 
2. Current U.S. Stem Cell Policy 
 On March 8, 2009, within seven weeks of taking office, President 
Obama revoked the eight-year old policy enacted by President Bush 
that limited federal funding of stem cell research and the 2007 execu-
tive order directed toward developing alternative methods of deriving 
hESCs.201 President Obama ordered the NIH to “support and conduct 
responsible, scientifically worthy human stem cell research, including 
human embryonic stem cell research” and to establish guidelines to 
that effect in 120 days.202 This policy change will now permit federal 
grants to be used for research on hESC lines created after the August 9, 
2001, cutoff date set by President Bush.203 In his accompanying re-
marks, President Obama stated, “In recent years, when it comes to stem 
cell research, rather than furthering discovery, our Government has 
forced what I believe is a false choice between sound science and moral 
values. In this case, I believe the two are not inconsistent.”204 Reactions 
from the scientific community were overwhelmingly positive.205 Inter-
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estingly, scientists in the U.K. have expressed some reservations that the 
new policy will lead more stem cell researchers to the United States.206 
 Although the federal limitations have now been lifted, it will likely 
take approximately a year for the first stem cell research grants to be 
approved under this new policy and for such funds to reach research-
ers.207 Scientists utilizing federal funds will no longer have to carefully 
demarcate expenditures for hESC research.208 Nonetheless, federal 
funding is still prohibited for the purposes of deriving new hESC lines 
from embryos, since the Dickey Amendment is still in effect.209 Until 
Congress acts to eliminate this bar on creating hESC lines, researchers 
will still be dependent upon private funding or must license established 
hESC lines.210 
Conclusion 
 While harmonization of patent laws will bring uniformity to global 
intellectual property protection, the application of moral criteria to 
patentability standards would only serve to increase uncertainty due to 
the great variability in cultural and social mores. As seen in the EU, and 
despite the implementation of the Biotech Directive, there are still in-
terpretative differences over stem cell patentability standards. More-
over, in light of the monopoly that patents provide and the importance 
of basic research in biotechnology, a balance must be struck between 
incentives to patentees and drawbacks to society as a whole. 
 Although the employment of moral criteria in U.S. policy is not 
novel, its application to the allocation of federal funding has been to the 
detriment of basic scientific endeavors. In combination with the overly 
expansive scope of the WARF patents, the funding limitations unduly 
constrained hESC research within the United States. As the WARF pat-
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ents will not expire for many years to come, it remains to be seen what 
effects the new U.S. funding policy will have on hESC research. 
